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Abstract
For situations where we are trying to decide which of two hypotheses H0 and H1
provides a better description of some data, we discuss the usefulness of plots of p0
versus p1, where pi is the p-value for testing Hi. They provide an interesting way of
understanding the difference between the standard way of excluding H1 and the CLs
approach; the Punzi definition of sensitivity; the relationship between p-values and
likelihood ratios; and the probability of observing misleading evidence. They also help
illustrate the Law of the Iterated Logarithm and the Jeffreys-Lindley paradox.
1 Introduction
Very often in particle physics we try to see whether some data are consistent with the
standard model (SM) with the currently known particles (call this hypothesis H0), or whether
it favors a more or less specific form of new physics in addition to the SM background (H1).
This could be, for example, a particular form of leptoquark with a well-defined mass; or with
a mass in some range (e.g. 50 to 1000 GeV). In the first case there are no free parameters
and H1 is described as being ‘simple’, while in the latter case, because of the unspecified
leptoquark mass, H1 is ‘composite’.
If the only free parameter in the alternative hypothesis H1 is the mass of some new
particle, we can test each mass in H1 separately against H0, in which case we are comparing
two simple hypotheses. However, the ensemble of different possible masses in the overall
procedure (known as a ‘raster scan’ [1]) makes H1 composite. Insight into this type of
situation is facilitated by two-dimensional ‘p-value plots’, where the significance of possible
observations under the null hypothesis is plotted against their significance under various
values of the free parameter in the alternative hypothesis [2]. The purpose of this article is
to use such plots to explore various aspects of hypothesis testing in particle physics1.
1In this article we concentrate on hypothesis testing procedures pertaining to discovery claims in search
experiments (not necessarily in particle physics). We do not consider other uses of hypothesis testing, such
as in particle physics event selection for instance. The desiderata are slightly different.
2 2 TYPES AND OUTCOMES OF HYPOTHESIS TESTING
We begin in section 2 by recapitulating the types of hypothesis testing familiar from
the statistics literature, and contrasting these with the practice in particle physics. Sec-
tion 3 introduces p-value plots and uses them to discuss the CLs criterion, upper limits,
fixed-hypothesis contours, and the Punzi definition of sensitivity. The probabilities for ob-
servations to fall into various regions of a p-value plot are derived in section 4, together with
the error rates and power of a particle physics test. Likelihood ratios form the subject of
section 5, where they are compared to p-values and used to plot contours and to compute
probabilities of misleading evidence. Two famous p-value puzzles are described in section 6.
Section 7 contains remarks on the effect of nuisance parameters, and our conclusions and
recommendations appear in section 8. An appendix provides technical details about the
relationship between CLs and Bayesian upper limits.
2 Types and outcomes of hypothesis testing
When using observed data to test one or more hypotheses, the first step is to design a test
statistic T that summarizes the relevant properties of the data. The observed value t of T is
then referred to its probability distribution under each specified hypothesis in order to assess
evidence. The form of the test statistic depends on the type of test one is interested in.
Comparisons of data with a single hypothesis are performed via ‘goodness of fit’ tests.
An example of this is the χ2 test, which generally requires the data to be binned, and where
T is equal to the sum of the squares of the numbers of standard deviations between observed
and expected bin contents. Another well-known technique, which does not require binning,
is the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, where T is constructed from the expected and observed
cumulative distributions of the data. There are many other techniques [3, 4]. The outcome
of a goodness-of-fit test is either ‘Reject’ or ‘Fail to reject’ the hypothesis of interest.
Comparison of the data with more than one hypothesis in order to decide which is
favored is known as ‘hypothesis testing’. If there are just two simple hypotheses H0 and H1,
the appropriate framework is Neyman-Pearson hypothesis testing. The optimal test statistic
T in this case is the likelihood ratio for the two hypotheses, or a one-to-one function of it 2.
The outcome of a Neyman-Pearson test is either ‘Reject H0 and accept H1,’ or ‘Accept H0
and reject H1.’
In particle physics it often happens that we need to consider additional possible outcomes
of a test. In the leptoquark example, an observed signal could be due to something entirely
different from a leptoquark: some new physics that we did not anticipate, or a systematic
bias that we did not model. Hence we may need to reject both H0 and H1 in favor of a third,
unspecified hypothesis. On the other hand it may also happen that the data sample does not
allow us to reject either H0 or H1 [5]. This leads to the formulation of a ‘double test’ of two
hypotheses H0 and H1, which are independently tested, resulting in four possible outcomes:
1. Fail to reject H0, and reject H1. This is referred to as ‘H1 excluded,’ and in a frequentist
approach the rejection of H1 is valid at some level of confidence, typically 95%.
2. Fail to reject H0 and fail to reject H1 (‘No decision’).
2In the case of a counting experiment, the number of observed counts n is typically a one-to-one function of
the likelihood ratio for the ‘signal+background’ and ‘background-only’ hypotheses (H1 and H0 respectively).
33. Reject H0, and fail to reject H1. This corresponds to ‘Discovery of H1.’ In a frequentist
approach the rejection of H0 is valid at some confidence level, which in particle physics
is usually much higher than the confidence level used for excluding H1. Typically the
significance level, defined as one minus the confidence level, is set at 2.87 × 10−7 for
rejecting H0. This is the area under a Gaussian tail, starting five standard deviations
away from the mean.
4. Reject both H0 and H1.
Often a likelihood ratio is used as the test statistic T for a double test.
For given H0 and for fixed values of the parameters in H1, we can plot the probability
density functions (pdf’s) of T , assuming (a) that hypothesis H0 is true, or (b) that H1 is
true. Three possible situations are shown in figure 1. In (a), the two hypotheses are hard
to distinguish as the pdf’s lie almost on top of each other; this could happen if H1 involved
a new particle that was only very weakly produced. In (b), the pdf’s still overlap to some
extent, but distinguishing between the two hypotheses may be possible for some data sets.
Finally (c) shows a situation where it is relatively easy to choose between the hypotheses.
3 p-Values
The degree to which the data are unexpected for a given hypothesis can be quantified via
the p-value. This is the fractional area in the tail of the relevant pdf, with a value of t at
least as extreme as that in the data. In tests involving two hypotheses, it is conventional to
use the one-sided tail in the direction of the other hypothesis. For the examples shown in
figure 1, this corresponds to p0 being the right-hand tail of H0 and p1 the left-hand tail of
H1.
3 In the extreme case where H0 and H1 coincide (and where t is continuous rather than
discrete), p0 + p1 = 1.
3.1 Regions in the (p0,p1) plane
Figure 2 contains a plot of p0 versus p1, with the regions for which the double test either
rejects H0 or fails to reject it; these depend solely on p0. In the diagram, the critical value
α0 for p0 is shown at 0.05; this value is chosen here for clear visibility on the plot, rather
than as a realistic choice.
In particle physics, when we fail to reject H0, we want to see further whether we can
exclude H1. Although not as exciting as discovery, exclusion can be useful from a theoretical
point of view and also for the purpose of planning the next measurement. The most famous
example is the Michelson-Morley experiment, which excluded any significant velocity of the
earth with respect to the aether and led to the demise of the aether theory. In figure 2, the
region p1 ≤ α1 is used for excluding H1. The critical value α1 is usually chosen to be larger
than the p0 cut-off α0; 0.05 is a typical value. In the figure α1 is shown at 0.10.
3In this paper we do not consider problems in which it is desired to reject H0 when the data statistic t
falls in the extreme left-tail of the H0 pdf (see figure 1), or to reject H1 when t is very large. Our p-values
are one-sided and would therefore be close to unity in these cases.
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If p0 and p1 fall in the large rectangle at the top right of the plot (p0 > α0 and p1 > α1),
we claim neither discovery of H1 nor its exclusion: this is the no-decision region. The small
rectangle near the origin corresponds to both p-values being below their cut-offs, and the
data are unlikely under either hypothesis. It could correspond to the new physics occurring,
but at a lower than expected rate.
3.2 The CLs criterion
An alternative approach for exclusion of H1 is the CLs criterion [6]. Because exclusion levels
are chosen to have modest values (say 95%), there is substantial probability (5%) that H1
will be excluded even when the experiment has little sensitivity for distinguishing H1 from
H0 (the situation shown in figure 1(a)). Although professional statisticians are not worried
about this, in particle physics it is regarded as unsatisfactory. To protect against this, instead
of rejecting H1 on the basis of p1 being small, a cut is made on
CLs ≡ p1
1− p0 , (1)
i.e. on the ratio of the left-hand tails of the H0 and H1 pdf’s. Thus if the pdf’s are
almost indistinguishable, the ratio will be close to unity, and H1 will not be excluded. In
figure 2, the region below the dashed line referred to as ‘CLs’ shows where H1 would be
excluded. This is to be compared to the larger region below the horizontal line for the more
conventional exclusion based on p1 alone. The CLs approach can thus be regarded as a
conservative modification of the exact frequentist method; conservatism is the price to pay
for the protection CLs provides against exclusion when there is little or no sensitivity to H1.
3.3 Upper limits
As pointed out in the introduction, the pdf of H1 often contains one or more parameters of
interest whose values are not specified (e.g. the mass of a new particle, the cross section of
a new process, etc.). It is then useful to determine the subset of H1 parameter space where,
with significance threshold α1, each parameter value is excluded by the observations. In the
frequentist paradigm, the complement of this subset is a CL = 1− α1 confidence region.
For a simple and common example consider the case where the pdf of the data depends
on the cross section µ of a new physics process: then µ > 0 if the process is present in
the data (H1 true), and µ = 0 otherwise (H0 true). Suppose that the test statistic T is
stochastically increasing with µ, meaning that for fixed T , increasing µ reduces the p-value
p1. Then the set of µ values that cannot be excluded by the observations has an upper limit,
and that upper limit has confidence level 1− α1.
If instead of rejecting H1 with the standard frequentist criterion p1 ≤ α1, we use the CLs
criterion CLs ≤ α1, the above procedure yields a CLs upper limit for µ, which is higher (i.e.
weaker) than the standard frequentist upper limit.
In the previous example suppose that, instead of a cross section, µ is a location parameter
for the test statistic t. More precisely, suppose that the pdf of t is of the form f(t−µ), with
f a continuous distribution. Then it can be shown that the upper limit using CLs at the
1 − α1 level coincides exactly with the credibility 1 − α1 Bayesian upper limit obtained by
3.4 Fixed-hypothesis contours in the (p0,p1) plane. 5
assuming a uniform prior for µ under H1 (i.e., a prior that is a non-zero constant for µ > 0,
and zero elsewhere). This result extends to the discrete case where t is a Poisson-distributed
event count with mean µ (see Appendix A).
3.4 Fixed-hypothesis contours in the (p0,p1) plane.
If we keep the hypotheses H0 and H1 fixed, but vary the observed data statistic t, the point
(p0,obs, p1,obs) will trace a contour in the (p0, p1) plane. In general this contour depends on
the particular characteristics of each hypothesis, but useful simplifications may occur when
the pdf of the test statistic is translation-invariant or enjoys other symmetries. Here we give
four examples based on the pdf’s shown in figure 3. The corresponding contours4 are drawn
in figure 4 and assume that the test is of the basic form H0 : µ = µ0 versus H1 : µ = µ1, with
µ1 > µ0, and that the test statistic is T
5. The parameter µ could be related to the strength
of a possible signal for a new particle with unknown mass. Increasing separation between µ0
and µ1 could then correspond to increasing amount of data; fixed amount of data and fixed
particle mass, but increasing cross section; fixed amount of data and varying particle mass,
with the cross section depending on the mass in a known way (i.e. raster scan).
Example 1: µ is the mean of a Gaussian distribution of known width σ:
T ∼ e
−1
2
(
t−µ
σ
)2
√
2piσ
. (2)
In this case the fixed-hypothesis contours only depend on ∆µ/σ, with ∆µ ≡ µ1 − µ0,
and have the form:
erf−1(1− 2 p1) + erf−1(1− 2 p0) = ∆µ√
2σ
. (3)
Figure 4(a) shows three examples of this, with ∆µ/σ = 0 (when the locus is the
diagonal line p0 + p1 = 1), 1.67 and 3.33. As ∆µ/σ increases, the curves pass closer to
the origin.
Example 2: µ is the mode of a Cauchy distribution with known half-width at half-height γ:
T ∼ γ
pi [γ2 + (t− µ)2] . (4)
The contours have a simple expression that depends only on ∆µ/γ:
tan
[(
1− 2 p1
) pi
2
]
+ tan
[(
1− 2 p0
) pi
2
]
=
∆µ
γ
. (5)
Example contours are shown in figure 4(b).
4Fixed-hypothesis contours on a (p0, p1) plot are closely related to ROC (Receiver Operating Character-
istic) curves, which have been used for many years in a variety of fields.
5Following standard convention we write T ∼ f(t) to indicate that f is the pdf of T (use of the ‘∼’ symbol
does not imply any kind of approximation).
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Example 3: µ is an exponential decay rate:
T ∼ µe−µt (6)
Here the fixed-hypothesis contours depend only on the ratio of µ1 to µ0:
ln(p1) =
µ1
µ0
ln(1− p0). (7)
An interesting generalization is to perform the test on a combination of n independent
decay time measurements Ti. In this case the likelihood ratio statistic is a one-to-one
function of the sum of the measurements, which we therefore take as our test statistic,
T ≡∑ni=1 Ti. The distribution of T is Gamma(n, µ), with n the shape parameter and
µ the rate parameter:
T ∼ µ
n tn−1 e−µt
Γ(n)
; (8)
the fixed-hypothesis contours depend on n and on the ratio µ1/µ0:
p1 = 1− P
(
n,
1
2
µ1
µ0
χ22n,p0
)
, (9)
where P (n, z) is the regularized incomplete gamma function and χ22n,p is the p-quantile
of a chisquared distribution with 2n degrees of freedom. Some example contours are
shown in figure 4(c). Unlike Gaussian or Cauchy contours, gamma contours are not
symmetric around the main diagonal of the plot.
Example 4: µ is a Poisson mean:
T ∼ µ
t
t!
e−µ (t integer). (10)
In this case the contours are discrete and must be computed numerically. Their de-
pendence on µ0 and µ1 does not simplify. A few examples are plotted in figure 4(d).
A common feature of examples 1-3 above is that the region of the plot above the diagonal
p0 + p1 = 1 is empty. This is a general consequence of our definition of one-sided p-values,
and of the fact, suggested by the requirement µ1 > µ0, that the bulk of the pdf f1(t) under
H1 lies to the right of the bulk of the pdf f0(t) under H0. In other words, for any t, the area
under f0 and to the right of t is smaller than the corresponding area under f1:
For all t :
∫ ∞
t
f0(u) du ≤
∫ ∞
t
f1(u) du. (11)
On the left-hand side one recognizes p0 and on the right-hand side 1 − p1, whence the
inequality p0 + p1 ≤ 1 follows. However, this is only strictly true for continuous pdf’s. For
discrete pdf’s, p0 and p1 both include the finite probability of the observation, so that it may
happen that p0 + p1 > 1 when f0 and f1 are very close to each other. This is evident in
figure 4(d) for the case µ0 = µ1 = 10.
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3.5 Asimov data sets
In a given data analysis problem, any data set (real or artificial) for which the parameter
estimators yield the true values is called an Asimov data set [7]. By evaluating a test
statistic on an Asimov data set one usually obtains an approximation to the median of that
test statistic, and the corresponding p-value will be the median p-value under the assumed
hypothesis. Median p-values are used to characterize the sensitivity of an experiment.
A simple example of the use of the fixed-hypothesis contours is that they map the abscissa
p0 = 0.5 onto the median value of p1 under H0, and vice-versa, the value p1 = 0.5 is mapped
onto the median of p0 under H1. These medians can be directly read off the plot. For the
Gaussian case with ∆µ/σ = 0.0, 1.67, or 3.33, the median p1 under H0 is 0.5, 4.7× 10−2, or
4.3 × 10−4, respectively. By symmetry of the Gaussian density, these values are also those
of the median p0 under H1.
By the invariance of probability statements under one-to-one transformations of random
variables, the median CLs under H0 can be obtained by plugging p0 = 1/2 into the definition
of CLs. This yields:
MedH0(CLs) = CLs|p0=1/2 =
p1
1− p0
∣∣∣∣
p0=1/2
= 2 p1|p0=1/2 = 2 MedH0(p1). (12)
Assuming H0 is true, the median CLs for testing H1 equals twice the median p1.
3.6 Punzi sensitivity
For large enough separation of the pdf’s, the fixed-hypothesis contour will keep out of the
no-decision region. Punzi [8] defines sensitivity as the expected signal strength required for
there to be a probability of at least 1−α1 for claiming a discovery with significance α0 (e.g. a
probability of 95% for discovery at the level of 2.87×10−7). This has the advantage that above
the sensitivity limit, the data are guaranteed to provide rejection of H0 at the significance
level α0, or exclusion of H1 at the significance level α1, or both; the data cannot fall in
the no-decision region. In figure 5, the Punzi sensitivity corresponds to a pdf separation
for which the (p0, p1) contour (not drawn) passes through the intersection of the vertical
dot-dashed and horizontal dashed lines. In the following we refer to this intersection as the
‘Punzi point’.
3.7 Effect of one-to-one transformations of the test statistic
P -values are probabilities and therefore remain invariant under one-to-one transformations
of the test statistic on which they are based. Plots of p0 versus p1 are similarly unaffected,
but one must remember that these plots involve two hypotheses, and that effects of a trans-
formation on the pdf’s of the test statistic under H0 and H1 are different. This is the reason
that, for example, the p0 versus p1 plot for testing the mode of a Gaussian pdf is not identical
to the plot for testing the mode of a Cauchy pdf, even though Gaussian and Cauchy variates
are related by one-to-one transformations (see examples 1 and 2 in section 3.4). We take a
closer look at this particular case here. Suppose that under H0 (H1) the test statistic X is
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Gaussian with mean µ0 (µ1) and width σ. Then, if H0 is true, the transformation
X −→ Y ≡ µc + γ tan
[
pi
2
erf
(
X − µ0√
2σ
)]
(13)
maps X into a Cauchy variate Y with mode µc and scale parameter γ. If on the other hand
H1 is true, X will be mapped into a variate Y with pdf
f(y) =
exp
[
−1
2
(
∆µ
σ
)2
+
√
2 ∆µ
σ
erf−1
[
2
pi
arctan
(
y−µc
γ
)]]
piγ
[
1 +
(
y−µc
γ
)2 ] , (14)
which is an asymmetric density that depends on three parameters: µc, γ, and ∆µ/σ ≡
|µ1 − µ0|/σ; it reduces to a Cauchy density in the limit ∆µ/σ → 0. Figure 6 compares the
two pdf’s. Thus, whereas in X space we are testing a Gaussian hypothesis against a Gaussian
hypothesis with a different mean, in Y space we are testing a Cauchy hypothesis against a
hypothesis with a rather different, asymmetrical distribution. However the p0 versus p1 plot
is the same in both spaces.
Another interesting property of one-to-one transformations of test statistics is that they
preserve the likelihood ratio (since the Jacobian of the transformation cancels in the ratio).
Thus, if fi is the pdf of X under Hi, i = 0, 1, and we transform X into Y with pdf’s gi, we
have:
g0(y)
g1(y)
=
f0(x)
f1(x)
. (15)
Suppose now that the X −→ Y transformation is the likelihood ratio transformation: y ≡
f0(x)/f1(x). Then it follows from the above equation that
g0(y) = y g1(y), (16)
a useful simplification. If one prefers to work with the logarithm of the likelihood ratio,
q ≡ ln y, and hi(q) is the pdf of q under Hi, then one finds:
h0(q) = e
q h1(q). (17)
Suppose for example that fi(x) is Gaussian with mean µi and width σ. The pdf’s of the
log-likelihood ratio are then:
h0(q) =
1√
2pi∆µ/σ
exp
−1
2
(
q − 1
2
(∆µ/σ)2
∆µ/σ
)2  , (18)
h1(q) =
1√
2pi∆µ/σ
exp
−1
2
(
q + 1
2
(∆µ/σ)2
∆µ/σ
)2  , (19)
and it is straightforward to verify equation (17).
The Gauss-versus-Gauss likelihood ratio f0(x)/f1(x) in the above example is invariant
under translations and rescalings of the original pdf’s (i.e. under addition of a common
9constant to µ0, µ1, and x; and under multiplication of µ0, µ1, σ, and x by a common factor).
These two invariances reduce the three numbers (µ0, µ1, and σ) required to specify the fi(x)
to a single one (∆µ/σ) for the hi(q). Note that ∆µ/σ is the ratio of the difference in means
to the standard deviation for the pair (f0, f1) as well as (h0, h1).
More generally, since the likelihood ratio transformation x → q is one-to-one, fixed-
hypothesis contours obtained from the hi(q) are identical to those obtained from the fi(x).
4 Outcome probabilities and error rates
A useful feature of (p0, p1) plots is that they help us map probabilities under H0 to prob-
abilities under H1 and vice-versa, using a simple graphical method. Suppose for instance
that we are interested in the outcome p0 ≤ 0.3. When H0 is true this has probability 0.3,
since p0 is uniformly distributed under H0. To find the probability under H1 we map the
interval 0 ≤ p0 ≤ 0.3 onto the p1 axis using the appropriate contour on figure 5, say the one
with ∆µ/σ = 1.67. This yields the interval 0.13 ≤ p1 ≤ 1. Since p1 is uniform under H1,
we can conclude that the outcome p0 ≤ 0.3 has probability 0.87 under H1. In a similar way,
it can be read from the figure that rejection of H0 (the outcome p0 ≤ α0) has probability
1 − β0 under H1, where β0 is the p1 coordinate of the intersection of the line p0 = α0 with
the relevant contour. As for rejection of H1 (the outcome p1 ≤ α1), this has probability
1 − β1 under H0, where β1 is the p0 coordinate of the intersection of the line p1 = α1 with
the contour.
The graphical method allows one to derive the probabilities under H0 and H1 of the
four possible outcomes of the double test (see Table 1). In computing these probabilities
Double Test
Decision
Probability Probability
Outcome Under H0 Under H1
p0 ≤ α0 & p1 ≤ α1 Reject H0 max(0, α0 − β1) max(0, α1 − β0)Reject H1
p0 ≤ α0 & p1 > α1 Reject H0 min(α0, β1) min(1− α1, 1− β0)Fail to reject H1
p0 > α0 & p1 ≤ α1 Fail to reject H0 min(1− α0, 1− β1) min(α1, β0)Reject H1
p0 > α0 & p1 > α1
Fail to reject H0 max(0, β1 − α0) max(0, β0 − α1)Fail to reject H1
Table 1: Possible outcomes of the double-test procedure, together with their probabilities
under H0 and H1. As expected, the probabilities under a given hypothesis all add up to one.
one needs to handle separately the cases where the separation between the pdf’s under H0
and H1 is smaller or larger than that corresponding to the Punzi sensitivity. Consider for
example the probability of outcome p0 > α0 & p1 > α1 under H0. Referring to Figure 5,
the contour with ∆µ/σ = 3.33 passes below the Punzi point, so that the desired probability
is zero. On the other hand, the contour with ∆µ/σ = 1.67 passes above that point, and
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the segment of contour above both the α0 and α1 thresholds has probability β1 − α0 under
H0. The probabilities for these two cases can be summarized as max(0, β1 − α0), as shown
in the table. An important caveat about the table is that the double test allows for the
possibility that an unspecified hypothesis other than H0 and H1 could be true, in which case
a separate column of probabilities would be needed. It is nevertheless reasonable to use this
table for performance optimization purposes, since H0 and H1 are the two main hypotheses
of interest.
Using Table 1 one can compute various error rates as well as the power of the double
test. In analogy with the nomenclature of Neyman-Pearson tests, we can say that there are
two Type-I errors, wrong decisions that are made when H0 is true:
Type-Ia error: Rejecting H0 when H0 is true. The probability of this error is
P(p0 ≤ α0 | H0) = max(0, α0 − β1) + min(α0, β1) = α0. (20)
This is the Type-I error rate in a standard Neyman-Pearson test of H0
against H1.
Type-Ib error: Failing to reject H1 when H0 is true. This has probability
P(p1 > α1 | H0) = min(α0, β1) + max(0, β1 − α0) = β1. (21)
It is of course possible to commit both a Type-Ia and a Type-Ib error on the same testing
problem. The rate of such double errors is not the product of the individual rates α0 and
β1, but rather, as Table 1 indicates, their minimum, min(α0, β1). Errors that are made when
H1 is true are called Type II:
Type-IIa error: Rejecting H1 when H1 is true. The probability is
P(p1 ≤ α1 | H1) = max(0, α1 − β0) + min(α1, β0) = α1. (22)
Type-IIb error: Failing to reject H0 when H1 is true. The rate of this error is
P(p0 > α0 | H1) = min(α1, β0) + max(0, β0 − α1) = β0. (23)
This is the Type-II error rate in a standard Neyman-Pearson test of H0
against H1.
The rate for committing both Type-II errors simultaneously is min(α1, β0). Finally, there is
a Type-III error, which has no equivalent in the Neyman-Pearson setup:
Type-III error: Failing to reject H0 and H1 when a third, unspecified hypothesis is true.
Without additional information about this third hypothesis it is not pos-
sible to calculate the Type-III error rate.
Since there is more than one Type-II error, there is some arbitrariness in the definition of
the power of the double test. One possibility is to define it as the probability of committing
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neither of the two Type-II errors, that is, as the probability of rejecting H0 and failing to
reject H1, when H1 is true:
P(p0 ≤ α0 & p1 > α1 | H1) = 1 − min(α1, β0) = min(1− α1, 1− β0). (24)
This is different from the power of the Neyman-Pearson test, which is 1− β0. Equation (24)
has a simple interpretation if we look at it in terms of the separation between the H0 and
H1 pdf’s (see figure 1). At low separation, β0 is large, and the power is dominated by our
ability to reject H0. At high separation (figure 1c), β0 is low, and the power is limited by
our willingness to accept H1 (as opposed to a third, unspecified hypothesis).
Instead of using p-values to decide between hypotheses, one can use likelihood ratios to
evaluate the evidence against them. In this case error rates are replaced by probabilities of
misleading evidence. The corresponding discussion can be found in Section 5.3.
5 Likelihood ratios
Rather than using p-values for discriminating between hypotheses, it is possible to make use
of a likelihood ratio6; this would also be the starting point for various Bayesian methods.
5.1 Likelihood-ratio contours
It is instructive to plot contours of constant likelihood ratio λ01 ≡ L0/L1 on the p0 versus
p1 plot. This needs some thought however, since a likelihood ratio calculation requires
three input numbers (the values µ0 and µ1 of the parameter µ under H0 and H1, and the
observed value t of the test statistic), whereas a point in the (p0, p1) plane only yields two
numbers. Our approach here is the following: for a set of contours with given λ01, we fix
the null hypothesis µ0 in order to map p0 to t, then solve the likelihood-ratio constraint
λ01 = L0(t, µ0)/L1(t, µ1) for µ1, and finally use t and µ1 to obtain p1. In this way, both the
likelihood ratio and the value of µ under H0 are constant along our likelihood-ratio contours,
but in general the value of µ under H1 varies point by point.
If the test statistic t itself is the likelihood ratio, the above procedure needs to be adjusted,
since now the pdf’s of t under H0 and H1 depend on both µ0 and µ1 (see for example
equations (18) and (19) in section 3.7). There is no longer a likelihood-ratio constraint to
solve. Instead, for pre-specified values of µ0 and t ≡ λ01, one maps p0 into µ1, and substitutes
t, µ0 and µ1 into the expression for p1.
Remarkably, for some of the simple cases examined in section 3.4 it turns out that the
likelihood-ratio contours are independent of µ0 and µ1. The contours do depend on the
family of pdf’s to which the data are believed to belong, but not on the particular family
members specified by the hypotheses. For the examples of section 3.4, the likelihood-ratio
contours take the following forms:
Example 1: µ is the mean of a Gaussian distribution of known width σ:[
erf−1 (1− 2 p1)
]2 − [erf−1 (1− 2 p0)]2 = ln(λ01). (25)
6Note that a likelihood ratio can be used as a test statistic T within a p-value method, or directly, without
the calibration provided by p-values. It is the latter case that we are considering in this section.
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Example 2: µ is the mode of a Cauchy distribution with known half-width at half-height γ:
1 +
[
tan
((
1− 2 p1
)
pi
2
)]2
1 +
[
tan
((
1− 2 p0
)
pi
2
)]2 = λ01. (26)
Example 3: µ is an exponential decay rate:[
P−1(n, p0)
P−1(n, 1− p1)
]n
eP
−1(n,1−p1)−P−1(n,p0) = λ01, (27)
where P−1(n, x) is the inverse, with respect to the second argument, of the regularized
incomplete gamma function (i.e., y = P−1(n, x) is equivalent to x = P (n, y)).
Example 4: µ is a Poisson mean:
There is no closed analytical expression, and the contours, which must be computed
numerically, depend on µ0 and µ1 (as opposed to just their difference or their ratio).
Figure 7 shows the λ01 = 0.37, 0.83, 1.0, 1.2 and 2.7 contours for these four cases. Along the
diagonal p1 = 1 − p0 (or close to it in the Poisson case), the H0 and H1 pdf’s are identical
and λ01 is unity. For symmetric pdf’s such as the Gaussian and Cauchy, the likelihood ratio
is also unity along the other diagonal line, p1 = p0. This is because the observed value of
the test statistic is then situated midway between the pdf peaks. For asymmetric pdf’s such
as the gamma and Poisson the likelihood ratio is no longer unity when p1 = p0, but there
is still a λ01 = 1 contour that starts at the origin of the plot and rises toward its middle.
Above and to the left of this curve, the likelihood ratio favors H1; below it, H0 is favored.
Loosely stated, the central limit theorem asserts that the distribution of the mean of
n measurements converges to a Gaussian as the sample size n increases. When the test
statistic is defined as such a mean, likelihood ratio contours will converge to their shape for
a Gauss versus Gauss test. This is illustrated in figure 8 for the exponential/gamma case
and in figure 9 for the Poisson case.
5.2 Comparison of p-values and likelihood ratios
A criticism against p-values is that they overstate the evidence against the null hypothesis [9,
10]. One aspect of this is that p-values tend to be impressively smaller than likelihood ratios.
The fact that they are not identical is no surprise. Likelihoods are calculated as the height of
the relevant pdf at the observed value of the statistic T , while p-values use the corresponding
tail area. Furthermore a p-value uses the pdf of a single hypothesis, while a likelihood ratio
requires the pdf’s of two hypotheses. As can be seen from figure 10, at constant p0 (even
if it is very small) L0/L1 can have a range of values, sometimes favoring H1, sometimes
H0. This will depend on the separation of the pdf peaks. Thus for Gaussian pdf’s, a p0
value of 3× 10−7 will favor H1 provided 0 < ∆µ/σ < 10, but for larger ∆µ/σ the observed
test statistic is closer to the H0 peak than to H1’s, and so even though the data are very
inconsistent with H0, the likelihood ratio still favors H0 as compared with H1.
Another example is given in Table 2; this uses simple Poisson hypotheses for both H0
and H1. It involves a counting experiment where the null hypothesis H0 predicts 1.0 event
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First data set Second data set
H0 Poisson, µ = 1 Poisson, µ = 10
H1 Poisson, µ = 10 Poisson, µ = 100
nobs 10 30
p0 1.1× 10−7 2.5× 10−7
5.2σ 5.0σ
p1 0.58 2.2× 10−16
−0.2σ 8.1σ
L0/L1 8× 10−7 1.2× 10+9
Strongly favors H1 Strongly favors H0
Table 2: Comparing p-values and likelihood ratios
and the alternative H1 predicts 10.0 events. In a first run 10 events are observed; both p0
and the likelihood ratio disfavor H0. Then the running time is increased by a factor of 10, so
that the expected numbers according to H0 and H1 both increase by a factor of 10, to 10.0
and 100.0 respectively. With 30 observed events, p0 corresponds to about 5σ as in the first
run, but despite this the likelihood ratio now strongly favors H0. This is simply because the
5σ nobs = 10 in the first run was exactly the expected value for H1, but with much more data
the 5σ nobs = 30 is way below the H1 expectation. In fact, in the second run, the p-value
approach rejects both H0 and H1.
More data corresponds to increasing pdf separation. Thus we are moving downwards
on a line at constant p0, resulting in a smaller p1, and provided p1 < 1/2, a larger L0/L1.
This is one motivation for hypothesis selection criteria that employ a decreasing value for
the rejection threshold α0 as the amount of data increases.
It is interesting to contrast the exclusion regions for H1 provided by cuts on p1 and on
the likelihood ratio L0/L1 = λ01 (see figures 2 and 7 respectively). The main differences
are at small and at large p0, where the excluded region extends up to p1 = α1 for p1 cuts,
but to much smaller p1 values for cuts on the likelihood ratio. At large p0, the likelihood
cuts resemble more those provided by CLs (see figure 2). At small p0, the likelihood cuts
correspond to the exclusion p1 cut-off α1 effectively decreasing as the H0 and H1 pdf’s become
more separated (e.g., as the amount of data collected increases).
5.3 Probability of misleading evidence in likelihood ratio tests
When studying the evidence provided by the likelihood ratio L0/L1 in favor of hypothesis H0,
an important quantity is the probability of misleading evidence. This is defined by Royall [11]
as the probability of observing L0/L1 > k, for a given k > 1, when H1 is true. Figure 10
shows how this probability can be determined by drawing the appropriate fixed-hypothesis
contour (dashed line, here corresponding to ∆µ/σ = 1.67) on top of the likelihood-ratio
contour of interest (here L0/L1 = 1.2). Larger likelihood-ratio contours intersect the dashed
line at lower values of p1. Therefore the probability of a larger likelihood ratio under H1,
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i.e., the probability of misleading evidence, is given by the p1-coordinate of the intersection
point X.
It is of course also possible to calculate the probability of misleading evidence that favors
H1 when H0 is actually true. For this we look at the intersection of a fixed-hypothesis
contour with a likelihood-ratio contour for which L0/L1 < 1, and we are concerned about
even smaller likelihood ratio values7. The probability of misleading evidence is then given
by the p0-coordinate of that intersection.
Careful inspection of the shape of the likelihood-ratio contours in figure 10 reveals that
the probabilities of misleading evidence are small at small values of ∆µ/σ (where there is
little chance of obtaining strong evidence in favor of either hypothesis), then increase to a
maximum, and finally become small again at large ∆µ/σ.
The determination of probabilities of misleading evidence from p0 and p1 coordinates may
give the impression that these probabilities could be calculated from the observed likelihood
ratio and reported ‘post-data’. According to the likelihoodist paradigm of statistics, this
view is incorrect. As emphasized in ref. [11], all the relevant evidence about the hypotheses
is contained in the likelihood ratio. The probabilities of misleading evidence should only
be used for experiment-planning purposes, by calculating them for standard likelihood ratio
values. By convention, a value of L0/L1 = 8 is defined as ‘fairly strong’ evidence in favor of
H0, whereas L0/L1 = 32 is said to be ‘strong’ evidence. Likelihood-ratio contours for these
values would not be visible on a linear plot such as figure 10. As shown in figure 11, a log-log
plot gives much better visualization.
6 Famous puzzles in statistics
The topic of p-values has generated many controversies in the statistics literature. In this
section we use p0 versus p1 plots to discuss a couple of famous puzzles that initiated some
of these controversies.
6.1 Sampling to a foregone conclusion
Suppose that in searching for a new physics phenomenon we adopt the following procedure:
1. Choose a discovery threshold α0, and let E be a set of candidate events, initially empty.
2. Add one candidate event to E and compute p0, the p-value to test the background-only
hypothesis H0 based on all events in E .
3. If p0 ≤ α0, reject H0, claim discovery, and stop; otherwise go back to step 2.
If the new physics phenomenon can be modeled by a simple hypothesis H1, we can also
compute the p-value p1 at step 2, and the whole procedure can be represented by a random
walk in the p0 versus p1 plane. At each step of the walk, the p-values are updated with the
7Just as the cut-offs α0 and α1 for p0 and p1 are usually taken to be (very) different, similarly when using
likelihood ratio cuts there is generally no necessity for one to be the reciprocal of the other.
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addition of a random new event. Four examples of such random walks are shown in figure 12,
two assuming that H0 is true, and two assuming that H1 is true.
What is the chance of the above procedure stopping when H0 is true? In other words,
what is the probability of incorrectly claiming discovery with this procedure? The answer,
perhaps surprisingly, is 100%, due to a result from probability theory known as the Law
of the Iterated Logarithm (LIL). The latter applies to any sequence of random variables
{X1, X2, X3, . . .} that are independent and identically distributed with finite mean µ0 and
variance σ2. Consider the Z-values constructed from partial sums of the Xi:
Zn =
1
n
∑n
i=1Xi − µ0
σ/
√
n
, for n = 1, 2, 3, . . . (28)
The LIL states that with probability 100% the inequality
| Zn | ≥ (1 + δ)
√
2 ln lnn (29)
holds for only finitely many values of n when δ > 0 and for infinitely many values of n when
δ < 0. At large n the Zn will be approximately standard normal and correspond to the
p-values
p0(n) =
∫ ∞
|Zn|
e−t
2/2
√
2pi
dt =
1
2
[
1− erf
( | Zn |√
2
)]
, (30)
so that the LIL of eqn. 29 can be rephrased as stating that, as n increases, the inequality
p0(n) ≤ 1
2
[
1− erf
(
(1 + δ)
√
ln lnn
)]
(31)
occurs infinitely many times if δ < 0. In particular, regardless of how small α0 is, at large n
the right-hand side of (31) will become even smaller; therefore, if δ < 0 the LIL guarantees
that p0(n) will cross the discovery threshold at some n, allowing the search procedure to
stop with a discovery claim. Crucial to this guarantee is the fact that inequality (31) occurs
infinitely many times for δ < 0; it will then certainly occur at n large enough to force a
crossing of the discovery threshold. In contrast, for δ > 0 there is a value of n beyond which
there are no crossings (and there may indeed be none at all for any n); rejection of H0 is not
guaranteed to occur.
In terms of designing a coherent search procedure, one can view the LIL as defining an
n-dependent boundary
αLIL(n) =
1
2
[
1− erf
(√
ln lnn
)]
. (32)
Any discovery threshold with an n-dependence that causes it to exceed this boundary at
large n is unsatisfactory since it is guaranteed to be crossed. It is instructive to draw the
LIL boundary on a p0 versus p1 plot. To each value of n there corresponds a fixed-hypothesis
contour on the plot (see figure 13). When testing H0, one point on the LIL boundary is then
given by the intersection of that contour with the line p0 = αLIL(n). By connecting all such
points across contours one obtains the blue lines drawn in figure 13 and in figure 12(a) and
(c) (note that n = 2 is the smallest integer for which αLIL(n) can be computed). When
testing H1, the LIL boundary is given by the intersections of the contours with the lines
p1 = αLIL(n), as shown in figure 12(b) and (d).
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Focusing on plots (a) and (c) of figure 12, we note that when H0 is true, the p1 coordinate
of random walks tends to decrease very rapidly as a function of n. The p0 coordinate is more
stable, but it does exhibit occasional excursions towards low p0 values. The LIL states that
the number of such excursions to the left of the blue line is finite (not infinite) as n goes to
infinity. However, any threshold curve to the right of the blue line will be crossed infinitely
many times. A constant threshold of the form p0 = α0 will be to the right of the blue line
at large n and is therefore unsatisfactory, in contrast with a threshold curve in the form of
a likelihood ratio contour (see figure 12) or with an n dependence of the form α0/
√
n (see
figure 13).
In particle physics we have constant thresholds of 3σ (α0 = 1.35 × 10−3) and 5σ (α0 =
2.87×10−7). Due to the iteration of logarithms in the LIL, it takes an enormously large value
of n for the blue line to cross these thresholds, so that the problem is not practically relevant.
The statistician I. J. Good once remarked that a statistician could “cheat by claiming at a
suitable point in a sequential experiment that he has a train to catch [. . . ] But note that
the iterated logarithm increases with fabulous slowness, so that this particular objection to
the use of tail-area probabilities is theoretical rather than practical. To be reasonably sure
of getting 3σ one would need to go sampling for billions of years, by which time there might
not be any trains to catch.” [12]
The LIL provides the weakest known constraint on the n-dependence of discovery thresh-
olds. It is a purely probabilistic characterization of tail probabilities under a single hy-
pothesis. Much more stringent constraints can be obtained by introducing an alternative
hypothesis and using statistical arguments (see for example [13]).
6.2 The Jeffreys-Lindley paradox
The Jeffreys-Lindley paradox occurs in tests of a simple H0 versus a composite H1, for
example:
H0 : µ = µ0 versus H1 : µ > µ0. (33)
The paradox is that for some values of the observed test statistic t, the value of p0 can be
small enough to cause rejection of H0 while the Bayes factor favors H0. Writing L0, L1(µ)
for the likelihood under H0, respectively H1, the Bayes factor is defined by
B01 ≡ L0∫
L1(µ) pi1(µ) dµ
, (34)
where pi1(µ) is a prior density for µ under H1. In order to understand the origin of the
paradox, it helps to note that this Bayes factor can be rewritten as a weighted harmonic
average of likelihood ratios:
B01 =
[∫
1
λ01(µ)
pi1(µ) dµ
]−1
, (35)
with λ01(µ) ≡ L0/L1(µ). As this formula suggests, it will prove advantageous to look at the
composite H1 as a collection of simple hypotheses about the value of µ, each with its own
simple-to-simple likelihood ratio λ01(µ) to the null hypothesis H0.
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In the following subsection we use this idea to develop basic insight into the origin of
the Jeffreys-Lindley paradox. Later subsections take a deeper look at the conditions under
which the paradox appears and at possible solutions.
6.2.1 Basic insight
Figure 14 illustrates the paradox for the case where the pdf of the test statistic t is Gaussian
with mean µ and standard deviation σ = 1. As in Section 5.2, consider a vertical line at the
relevant p0 in plot (a); this crosses a series of different λ01 contours. At point b, the H0 and
H1 pdf’s are identical (see plot (b)), and the likelihood ratio is unity. Point c is at p1 = 0.5,
with the H1 pdf having its maximum exactly at the position of the data statistic t. The
likelihood ratio now favors H1, and is in agreement with the small p0 value in rejecting H0.
Plots (d) and (e) show even larger separations between H0 and H1. In plot (d), corresponding
to point d in plot (a), the position of the H1 pdf is such that the data statistic t is midway
between the H0 and H1 peaks. Thus p0 = p1 and point d lies on the diagonal of plot (a), with
the likelihood ratio again unity. Finally, with the larger separation of plot (e), the likelihood
ratio now favors H0, even though p0 is small; the likelihood ratio and p0 lead to opposite
conclusions.
To go from the series of simple H1’s to the composite H1 with unspecified µ in the
Jeffreys-Lindley paradox, we take the weighted harmonic average of the likelihood ratios
λ01, with the weighting given by the prior pi1(µ) as in equation (35). As we integrate along
the vertical line in plot (a), the contributions between points b and d favor H1. Lower down,
from d to e and beyond, H0 is favored. The Bayes factor will thus end up favoring H0 if the
integration range is wide enough8 and suitably weighted by the prior pi1(µ). This explains
the mechanism by which the Jeffreys-Lindley paradox can occur.
6.2.2 Regions in the plane of p0 versus prior-predictive p1
To visualize the conditions under which the Jeffreys-Lindley paradox appears, we generalize
the p0 versus p1 plot to the case of a composite H1 by making use of the prior-predictive
p-value [14]; this is a prior-weighted average p-value over H1:
p1pp ≡
∫
pi1(µ)
∫ t0
−∞
f(t | µ) dt dµ, (36)
where f(t | µ) is the pdf of T and t0 its observed value. To fix ideas, assume that f is
Gaussian with mean µ and standard deviation σ (not necessarily equal to 1), and that the
prior pi1(µ) is the indicator function of the interval [µ0, µ0 + τ ] for some positive τ :
pi1(µ) ≡ pi1(µ | τ) = 1
τ
1[µ0, µ0+τ ](µ) =

1
τ
if µ0 < µ ≤ µ0 + τ,
0 otherwise.
(37)
8The value of µ, which determines the separation between the corresponding simple H1 and H0, varies
non-linearly with distance along the line bcde, such that there is generally a far wider range of µ values below
the diagonal than above it.
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In the absence of detailed prior information about µ, one could think of this prior as modeling
the range of µ values deemed to be theoretically and/or experimentally relevant for the search
experiment of interest. In any case the exact shape of pi1 is not material to the paradox, only
the ratio of length scales τ/σ is. Reference [15] discusses the choice of τ in several particle
physics experiments.
Use of p1pp calls for a couple of caveats. First, a small value of p1pp does not imply that
all values of µ under H1 are disfavored. In general it only provides evidence against the
overall model (prior plus pdf) under H1. However with the particular choice of prior (37),
and assuming that τ/σ is sufficiently large, small p1pp implies that the vast majority of µ
values under H1 are unable to explain the data. Second, the distribution of p1pp under a
fixed value of µ in H1 is not uniform. Hence, in a linear plot of p0 versus p1pp, distances
along the p1pp axis cannot be interpreted as probabilities under a fixed µ in H1 (contrast
Section 4). However, such distances can still be interpreted as prior-predictive probabilities,
with pdf given by the integral of f(t | µ) over pi1(µ).
Figure 15 shows fixed-hypothesis contours (fixed µ0, σ, and τ) and constant Bayes factor
contours in the p0 versus p1pp plane. For the testing situation examined here, fixed-hypothesis
contours only depend on the ratio τ/σ and are labeled accordingly. The constant Bayes factor
contours are labeled by the value of B01. For τ/σ = 0, H1 coincides with H0 and the resulting
fixed-hypothesis contour is a subset of the B01 = 1 contour. As τ/σ increases, the ability
of the test to distinguish between H0 and H1 also increases. Figure 16 presents a log-log
version of the same plot. This allows the drawing of contours with a wider range of Bayes
factor values, B01 = 1, 3, 20, and 150. According to ref. [16], a Bayes factor between 1 and
3 represents evidence “not worth more than a bare mention;” between 3 and 20, “positive;”
between 20 and 150, “strong;” and greater than 150, “very strong.” One can identify the
following regions in the plot:
Upper Left: At small values of p0 and small values of τ/σ (red contour region), the Bayes
factors disfavor H0. There is agreement between Bayes factors and p-values.
Lower Left: At small values of p0 and large values of τ/σ (green contour region), the Bayes
factors favor H0. There is disagreement between Bayes factors and p-values. This is
where the Jeffreys-Lindley paradox shows up. For a numerical example, consider a p0
value of 2.87 × 10−7 (5σ); the corresponding Bayes factor in favor of H0 will then be
1, 3, 20, or 150, if the ratio τ/σ is approximately 6.7 × 105, 2.0 × 106, 1.3 × 107, or
1.0× 108, respectively. Note the extremely large values of τ/σ required for producing
the paradox. This is a consequence of the stringent 5σ convention applied to discovery
claims in particle physics.
Upper Right: This is a region with relatively large values of p0 and p1, and where the
Bayes factor hovers around 1. Regardless of how one looks at it, there is not enough
evidence to decide between H0 and H1.
Lower Right: Here p1 is small and B01 large. Both support the rejection of H1 in favor of
H0.
Curves of constant τ/σ represent fixed experimental conditions, such that repeated obser-
vations would fall randomly (but not necessarily uniformly) along one such curve. On a
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given curve there is agreement between p-values and Bayes factors at high and low p0, but
somewhere in between there is a region of either no-decision (low τ/σ) or paradox (high
τ/σ).
6.2.3 Possible solutions to the paradox
Over the years many solutions have been proposed to the Jeffreys-Lindley paradox. Here we
briefly illustrate two arguments.
The first argument essentially blames the p-value method for the paradox and argues
that with increasing values of τ/σ the p-value discovery threshold α0 should be lowered.
This argument is usually applied to the situation where σ depends on a sample size n, so
that τ/σ is proportional to
√
n. In figure 16 for example, one could think of the contours
τ/σ = 1, 10, 100,. . . as corresponding to n = 1, 100, 10 000,. . . , respectively. If one chooses
a discovery threshold of 1% on the τ/σ = 1 contour, 0.1% on the τ/σ = 10 contour, and so
on, the dot-dashed curve labeled p0 = α0/
√
n (where α0 is the discovery threshold on the
τ/σ = 1 contour) is obtained. At large τ/σ this curve follows pretty closely the shape of the
constant Bayes factor contours. Thus, cutting on p0 < α0/
√
n instead of p0 < α0 avoids the
Jeffreys-Lindley paradox. Interestingly, this is the same solution that was proposed to avoid
sampling to a foregone conclusion in section 6.1.
In a similar vein, it has been argued [17] that for experiments that collect more and more
data, the realistic values of µ to be considered under H1 (assuming that no evidence for
µ > µ0 has been obtained, and we still believe that a small difference is possible) should
be those that are closer and closer to µ0. Thus the prior pi1(µ | τ) in equation (37) should
become narrower (smaller τ), and this prevents B01 favoring H0 (as shown in figure 16).
For the second argument, note that in the region of disagreement between p0 and Bayes
factors, both p0 and p1pp tend to be small: one is in the double-rejection region of the test
for most values of µ under H1. This should alert the experimenter to the possibility that
a third hypothesis may be true, or that there may be a mismodeling error. One such error
could be that H0, rather than a point null hypothesis, is in fact an interval hypothesis with
width . Thus, instead of (33), one should really be testing
H0 : µ0 −  < µ ≤ µ0 versus H1 : µ > µ0. (38)
We consider two different regimes for . The first has /σ = 0.01 or 1, corresponding to a
small or moderate widening of the original H0. The second regime uses /σ = 100 or 10
4,
which almost changes H0 to µ ≤ µ0, the complement of H1 : µ > µ0. For both regimes one
will need to introduce a prior pi0(µ) for µ under H0, and the Bayes factor becomes:
B01 ≡
∫
L0(µ) pi0(µ) dµ∫
L1(µ) pi1(µ) dµ
. (39)
For the p-value under H0 one could again consider a prior-predictive version:
p0pp ≡
∫
pi0(µ)
∫ +∞
t0
f(t | µ) dt dµ, (40)
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or choose a frequentist approach, such as the supremum p-value [18]:
p0 sup ≡ sup
µ∈[µ0−, µ0]
∫ +∞
t0
f(t | µ) dt. (41)
Figures 17 and 18 illustrate the effect of these two definitions on the Jeffreys-Lindley paradox.
Note first that in both cases one recovers figure 16 when /σ is small. When the prior-
predictive p0pp of equation (40) is used (figure 17), a given observation above µ0 becomes
more significant since its p0-value is averaged over µ values below µ0. This causes the fixed-
hypothesis contours to be compressed towards low p0. At the same time, the Bayes factor of
such an observation tends to decrease due to the numerator being replaced by an average;
this causes the constant Bayes factor contours to move down. The net effect of these contour
changes is to leave the paradox in place. This can be seen, for example, by considering the
point with p0 = 10
−4 on the τ/σ = 10 000 contour. In all four plots of figure 17 this point
hardly moves, having a Bayes factor B01 close to 3.
On the other hand, when the supremum p-value of equation (41) is used for p0 (figure 18),
only the constant Bayes factor contours change. The fixed-hypothesis contours stay the same,
because the supremum of p0 over the interval [µ0 − , µ0] is attained at µ = µ09. For fixed
τ/σ, increasing /σ causes the paradoxical region to be pushed toward larger values of p0 and
smaller values of p1. Eventually the p-values agree with the Bayes factor and the paradox
disappears. In principle one could even tune the value of /σ to obtain B01 = 1 at a specified
value of p0 (keeping τ/σ constant). Smaller values of p0 would then correspond to B01
disfavoring H0, and larger p0 to B01 favoring H0.
We conclude from this discussion of the second argument that introduction of a scale 
under H0 is by itself not sufficient to suppress the paradox. One also needs to specify how
to handle  in the computation of p0. Furthermore, as shown in figure 18 the paradox is not
fully suppressed unless /σ is substantially larger than 1, of the same order as τ/σ. Thus,
the hierarchy   σ  τ , presented in ref. [15], is sufficient to produce the paradox, but
not necessary. When using the supremum p-value, the condition [ τ and σ  τ ] is both
necessary and sufficient.
6.2.4 Simple versus simple version of the Jeffreys-Lindley paradox
Figures 15 and 16 do not look very different from figures 10 and 11 discussed in the sections
on likelihood ratios, in spite of the use of a different p1 definition. This is a consequence of
the fact that the Jeffreys-Lindley paradox can be reformulated in the context of a simple
versus simple test 10. As noted at the beginning of section 6.2, the paradox occurs for tests
of the form:
Test 1: H0 : µ = µ0 versus H1 : µ > µ0, (42)
using a test statistic T ∼ f(t | µ) and assuming a prior pi1(µ | τ) for µ under H1, where τ
characterizes the scale of pi1.
9Note that the supremum of p1 over the interval ]µ0, µ0 + τ ] is also attained at µ = µ0, so that p0 sup +
p1 sup = 1 (for continuous pdf’s). Therefore there is nothing to be learned from a plot of p0 sup versus p1 sup.
10The simple versus simple scenario outlined in this section is unrelated to the basic insight described in
section 6.2.1.
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To proceed with the reformulation, introduce a variate X whose randomness is the result
of a two-step generating process: X ∼ f(x | µ), where µ ∼ pi1(µ | θ). Thus, for fixed θ the
distribution of X is:
f˜(x | θ) =
∫
pi1(µ | θ) f(x | µ) dµ. (43)
If for example f(x | µ) is Gaussian with mean µ and standard deviation σ, and pi1(µ | θ) is
the indicator function of the interval [µ0, µ0 + θ], this will yield:
f˜(x | θ) = 1
2 θ
[
erf
(
µ0 + θ − x√
2σ
)
− erf
(
µ0 − x√
2σ
)]
. (44)
As θ → 0 this pdf approaches f(x | µ0), and we will assume that this remains true for any
choice of prior pi1 (i.e., that for θ = 0, pi1(µ | θ) is a delta function at µ = µ0).
Consider now the simple versus simple test:
Test 2: H0 : θ = 0 versus H1 : θ = τ, (45)
using the test statistic X ∼ f˜(x | θ). Test 2 is designed to determine whether or not the
additional source of randomization pi1 is present in the process that generates X. If θ = 0,
there is no additional randomization and µ = µ0. On the other hand, if θ = τ , additional
randomization is present, its magnitude agrees with the prediction under H1 in Test 1, and
we must have µ > µ0. Tests 1 and 2 yield the same information about µ. However, since
H1 is composite in Test 1 but simple in Test 2, this has some interesting consequences. The
p-value p1 is prior-predictive in Test 1 but standard frequentist in Test 2 (as can be seen
by interchanging the order of integration in equation (36)). The Bayes factor in Test 1 is a
likelihood ratio for Test 2. Tests 1 and 2 yield the same p0 versus p1 plots. The Jeffreys-
Lindley paradox, which is a disagreement between p-values and Bayes factors in Test 1, is
a disagreement between p-values and likelihood ratios in Test 2. This purely frequentist
version of the Jeffreys-Lindley paradox is illustrated in figure 19 using the pdf f˜(x | θ) of
equation (44). It shows that when testing a narrow distribution against a very broad one, it
is possible to observe data with small p-value under the narrow-distribution hypothesis and
yet large likelihood ratio in favor of that hypothesis.
Even though Test 1 is not of the simple versus simple type, it is possible to define a
likelihood ratio statistic for it, as the ratio of the likelihood under H0 to the maximized
likelihood under H1, where the maximum is taken over µ > µ0. An interesting quantity is
the Ockham factor, defined as the ratio of the Bayes factor to this likelihood ratio. For Test 1
the Ockham factor is approximately τ/(
√
2pi σ). This is approximately proportional to the
ratio of the widths of the distributions under H1 and H0 in Test 2. More interestingly, at
large τ/σ the Type-II error rate of the simple versus simple test equals Nσσ/τ , where Nσ is
the number of standard deviations corresponding to the cutoff α0 used to reject H0. Hence
the Type-II error rate is inversely proportional to the Ockham factor: if the alternative
hypothesis is true, the probability of rejecting the null with p0 increases with τ/σ, but so
does the disagreement between p0 and B01! Referring again to figure 19, we see that for
small x values (say below x = 2), Bayes factors and p-values both favor H0. At high x they
both disfavor H0. In between there is a region where agreement between p-values and Bayes
factors depends on the Ockham factor.
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7 Nuisance parameters
There are many methods for eliminating nuisance parameters from p-value calculations (see
for example [18]), and the choice of method will generally have an effect on the construction
of p0 versus p1 plots. We start with a couple of examples.
First consider the situation where one makes n measurements xi from a Gaussian popu-
lation with unknown mean µ and unknown width σ. A sufficient statistic consists of the pair
(x¯, s), where x¯ = 1
n
∑n
i=1 xi is the sample mean and s = [
1
n−1
∑n
i=1(xi− x¯)2]1/2 is the sample
standard deviation. To test the hypotheses Hi : µ = µi (i = 0, 1), the classical approach
uses the test statistics ti =
√
n (x¯ − µi)/s, which have Student’s t distribution under the
respective Hi. Thus one can calculate the p-values p0 and p1. Unfortunately the relation
between p0 and p1 is not one-to-one: from p0 one can obtain t0, but from t0 one cannot
extract both x¯ and s, which are needed to compute t1 and then p1. Hence it is not possible
to make a plot of p0 versus p1. This problem is related to the fact that the power of the t
test depends on the unknown value of σ and not just on the significance threshold α.
For the second example we consider the observation of a Poisson variate N , whose mean
is the product of a parameter of interest µ and a nuisance parameter κ. Again we wish to
test H0 : µ = µ0 versus H1 : µ = µ1. Information about the nuisance parameter comes
from a second Poisson measurement K, with mean κ. A well-known approach for this case
is to condition on the sum N + K. The distribution of N , given a fixed value of N + K, is
binomial with parameter µ/(1 + µ). Here one can calculate conditional p-values p0 and p1,
and plot one against the other.
The above examples rely on a special structure of the problem under study to eliminate
nuisance parameters. Unfortunately such a special structure is not always available, and
even when it is, it does not guarantee that a (p0, p1) plot can be constructed. Here we offer
a couple of suggestions for handling the general case. The first one is to use parametric
bootstrap techniques to eliminate the nuisance parameters. To first order these techniques
consist in substituting an estimate for the unknown nuisance parameter values. The result-
ing p-values are generally no longer uniform under their respective null hypothesis, but there
exist higher-order refinements that restore some of that uniformity [19]. Bootstrap computa-
tions can quickly become rather intensive, but they have the advantage of being frequentist
and therefore preserving the error structure of the tests discussed in section 4. As for the
likelihood ratios, they can be replaced by profile likelihood ratios. Although the latter are
not genuine likelihood ratios, with some caveats they can still be treated as representing
statistical evidence in large samples [11].
Our second suggestion is to apply Bayesian methods on the nuisance parameters. Ef-
fectively, this amounts to replacing composite hypotheses by simple ones, by integrating
out the nuisance parameters over an appropriate proper prior. Suppose for example that
the probability density of the data x under Hi is given by f(x | µi, ν), with ν a vector of
nuisance parameters with prior pi(ν). Then we simply replace f by
f ?(x | µi) =
∫
f(x | µi, ν) pi(ν) dν (46)
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in the formulation of the hypotheses. The p-values become prior-predictive p-values:
p?i =
∫ ∞
x0
f ?(x | µi) dx =
∫ ∞
x0
∫
f(x | µi, ν) pi(ν) dν dx
=
∫ [∫ ∞
x0
f(x | µi, ν) dx
]
pi(ν) dν =
∫
pi(ν) pi(ν) dν (47)
(compare equation (36)), and the likelihood ratios become Bayes factors:
λ01 =
f ?(x0 | µ0)
f ?(x0 | µ1) =
∫
f(x0 | µ0, ν) pi(ν) dν∫
f(x0 | µ1, ν) pi(ν) dν . (48)
Although this approach lacks the frequentist error interpretation of the tests, it still enjoys
the evidential interpretation of the p-values and Bayes factors. It is also conceptually simpler
and more elegant, as well as computationally much easier, than the bootstrap.
8 Conclusion
We find that (p0, p1) plots such as figs. 5, 10 and 11 provide useful insights into several
diverse statistical aspects of searches for new physics:
• The CLs criterion for exclusing H1;
• The Punzi definition of sensitivity;
• The relationship between p-values and likelihoods;
• The difference between the exclusion regions using p-values and likelihoods;
• The probabilities of misleading evidence;
• The Jeffreys-Lindley paradox.
In addition, we believe that these plots could be helpful in summarizing the results of such
searches. When these involve many channels, with possibly different sensitivities, one could
plot the results as points on a (p0, p1) plot, together with Gaussian likelihood-ratio contours
(since the latter are large-sample limits of the actual data pdf’s). This would provide a
convenient graphical overview of both the p-value and the likelihood-ratio evidence contained
in the ensemble of channels investigated.
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26 A THE BAYES-CLS CONNECTION
A The Bayes-CLs connection
This appendix describes a sufficient condition for CLs upper limits to agree with Bayesian
upper limits.
Let f(x | µ) be a family of probability densities for the random variable X, indexed by
the parameter µ, and consider the family of tests:
H0[µ
?] : µ = µ? versus H1[µ
?] : µ > µ?. (49)
Suppose we observe X = x0. If we have a prior pi(µ) for µ under H1[µ
?], the Bayesian
evidence in favor of H1[µ
?] is simply the marginal probability of x0 under H1[µ
?]:
p(x0 | H1[µ?]) =
∫ +∞
µ?
f(x0 | µ) pi(µ) dµ. (50)
Note that this probability is only correctly normalized if pi(µ) is a proper prior. However,
the argument that follows remains valid if pi(µ) is improper. The p-value evidence against
H0[µ
?], when the alternative is H1[µ
?], is:
p0(µ
?) =
∫ +∞
x0
f(x | µ?) dx = 1− F (x0 | µ?), (51)
where F (x | µ) is the cumulative probability distribution of x. This p-value evidence against
H0[µ
?] increases as 1 − p0(µ?) increases. Assume now that the Bayesian and frequentist
evidences are equal for all µ? values larger than some prespecified µ0:
p(x0 | H1[µ?]) = 1− p0(µ?), for all µ? ≥ µ0, (52)
or: ∫ +∞
µ?
f(x0 | µ) pi(µ) dµ =
∫ x0
−∞
f(x | µ?) dx, for all µ? ≥ µ0. (53)
This condition is sufficient to obtain equality of CLs and Bayesian upper limits on µ under
H1[µ0]. Indeed, the γ-credibility level upper limit µU on µ is the solution of:∫ µU
µ0
p(µ | x0, H1[µ0]) dµ = γ, (54)
where the integrand is the posterior density of µ under H1[µ0]:
p(µ | x0, H1[µ0]) = f(x0 | µ) pi(µ)∫ +∞
µ0
f(x0 | µ′) pi(µ′) dµ′
=
f(x0 | µ) pi(µ)
p(x0 | H1[µ0]) . (55)
Substituting equation (55) in (54) leads to:
p(x0 | H1[µ0])− p(x0 | H1[µU ])
p(x0 | H1[µ0]) = γ, (56)
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and using condition (52) yields:
1− 1− p0(µU)
1− p0(µ0) = γ. (57)
The quantity 1−p0(µU) is in fact p1(µU), the p-value for testing µ = µU when the alternative
is µ = µ0. Hence, equation (57) is equivalent to
p1(µU)
1− p0(µ0) = 1− γ, (58)
which corresponds to the CLs construction of upper limits.
We illustrate this result with two examples of families of distributions that satisfy condi-
tion (52). The first one is any family of continuous distributions parametrized by a location
parameter:
f(x | µ) = f(x − µ). (59)
It is straightforward to verify, by integration by substitution, that∫ x
−∞
f(x′ − µ) dx′ =
∫ +∞
µ
f(x − µ′) dµ′, (60)
so that condition (52) is indeed satisfied for a flat prior, pi(µ) = 1. The second example is
the Poisson family:
f(n | µ) = µ
n
n!
e−µ, (61)
for which we have:
n∑
i=0
µi
i!
e−µ =
∫ +∞
µ
tn
n!
e−t dt, (62)
as can be checked by repeated integration by parts of the right-hand side. Although this is
a discrete version of condition (52), also with a flat prior, nothing essential changes in the
argument leading from (54) to (58).
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Figure 1: Probability density functions (pdf’s) of a test statistic T under two hypotheses
H0 (solid) and H1 (dot-dashed). In (a) the separation of the pdf’s is small, making the two
hypotheses almost indistinguishable. The separation in (b) is such that the data can exclude
H1, reject neither H0 nor H1, or reject H0. Given an observed value t of the test statistic
T , diagram (b) illustrates the definitions of p0 and p1: p0 is the tail area under H0 in the
direction of H1, whereas p1 is the tail area under H1 in the direction of H0. The quantities
tcrit0 and tcrit1 are the critical values of T , beyond which the data are considered incompatible
with H0 and H1 respectively; the value of p0 at T = tcrit0 is α0. The p1 value at this value
of T is denoted by β0. In (c) the pdf’s are far apart and the observed value of T will always
reject at least one hypothesis.
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Figure 2: Plot of p0 versus p1 with three lines: The vertical line at p0 = α0 is an example
of a cut used for rejecting H0 when p0 is small. Correspondingly, the horizontal line at
p1 = α1 could be used for excluding H1 when p1 is small (less than 10% in the figure). If the
observed value of the test statistic T was such that (p0, p1) was in the large rectangle, the
data would be consistent with both hypotheses, while for the small rectangle near the origin,
it would be inconsistent with both. An alternative procedure for excluding H1 is based on
CLs = p1/(1− p0), and requires (p0, p1) to be below the sloping line.
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Figure 3: Probability densities (plots a, b, and c) and probabilities (plot d) used to draw
fixed-hypothesis contours on figure 4.
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Figure 4: Fixed-hypothesis contours in the p0 versus p1 plane for four different choices of pdf:
(a) Gauss, (b) Cauchy, (c) Gamma, and (d) Poisson. In each case one is testing H0 : µ = µ0
versus H1 : µ = µ1 where µ is the mean of the distribution (or mode, in the case of Cauchy).
In the Gauss, Cauchy, and Gamma cases, the contours depend on a simple combination of
µ0 and µ1, but not on their individual values. The line p1 = 1 − p0 is an upper boundary
for observable p-values in plots (a), (b), and (c), but not in the discrete Poisson case of plot
(d).
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Figure 5: Plot of p0 versus p1 with fixed-hypothesis contour lines, as in figure 4(a). For fixed
pdf’s under H0 and H1, the possible values of the test statistic T correspond to a curve in
the (p0, p1) plane. The examples shown are for Gaussian pdf’s where ∆µ/σ is zero (i.e.,
identical pdf’s under H0 and H1), 1.67 and 3.33. When ∆µ/σ = 3.33, the separation of the
pdf’s is large enough that the data cannot fall in the large no-decision region, defined by
p0 > α0 & p1 > α1. We refer to the black dot at the intersection of the horizontal dashed
and vertical dot-dashed lines as the ‘Punzi point’ (see text). For a given choice of α0, the
intersection of the line p0 = α0 with the relevant contour has ordinate β0, the probability of
failing to reject H0 when H1 is true (the plot shows this for the ∆µ/σ = 1.67 contour). The
relation between α1 and β1 is similar.
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Figure 6: Solid line: Cauchy probability density function with mode µc and scale parameter
γ both equal to 1. Dashed line: asymmetric pdf obtained by a one-to-one transformation of
the Cauchy density (see equation (14) in the text, with µc = γ = ∆µ/σ = 1).
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Figure 7: Contours of constant likelihood ratio λ01 ≡ L0/L1 in the p0 versus p1 plane for
four different choices of pdf: (a) Gauss, (b) Cauchy, (c) Gamma, and (d) Poisson, where the
lines merely join up the discrete (p0, p1) points as “contours”. In each case one is testing
H0 : µ = µ0 versus H1 : µ = µ1 where µ is the pdf mean for Gauss and Poisson, mode
for Cauchy, and rate parameter for Gamma. To facilitate comparison, the same contours
are drawn in all four cases. In plot (d), points line up vertically across contours, since by
construction µ0 is the same everywhere.
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Figure 8: Likelihood-ratio contours for testing the value of an exponential decay rate for
four different values of the number n of decay time measurements included in the test (solid
lines), compared with the corresponding contours for a Gaussian test (dashed lines). At
large n, the exponential contours converge to the Gaussian ones. From left to right in each
plot, the contours correspond to λ01 = 1/32, 1/8, 8, and 32.
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Figure 9: Likelihood-ratio contours for testing the value of a Poisson mean for four different
values of the number n of measurements included in the test (dots), compared with the
corresponding contours for a Gaussian test (dashed lines). At large n, the Poisson contours
converge to the Gaussian ones. From left to right in each plot, the contours correspond to
λ01 = 1/32, 1/8, 8, and 32.
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Figure 10: Plot of p0 versus p1 with likelihood ratio contours (colored, solid lines), when
the pdf’s are Gaussians of equal width. The likelihood ratio is unity along the p1 = 1 − p0
diagonal, where H1 is identical to H0, and along the p1 = p0 diagonal, where the observed
value of the test statistic favors each hypothesis equally. Going down a line of constant p0
from p1 = 0.5 to p1 = 0 corresponds to increasing separation of the pdf’s (e.g., more and
more data), and also to increasing L0/L1. This gives rise to the possibility of p0 being small
while L0/L1 is large. In fact one could exclude H0 or H1 based on the observed likelihood
ratio instead of p0 or p1; the corresponding exclusion regions have a different shape from the
p-value exclusion regions. The dashed line is a contour of constant ∆µ/σ. Its intersections
with likelihood-ratio contours provides various probabilities of misleading evidence (see text).
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Figure 11: Log-log version of the plot of p0 versus p1, assuming that the pdf’s of the test
statistic under H0 and H1 are Gaussian with the same width. Solid lines show the likelihood-
ratio contours for L0/L1 = 1/32, 1/8, 1, 8 and 32, and dashed lines show the fixed-hypothesis
contours for ∆µ/σ = 1.67 and 3.33. The p0 coordinates of points a, b, c and d, and the p1
coordinates of points A, B, C and D yield the probabilities of misleading evidence listed in
the table below.
∆µ/σ 1.67 3.33
P(L0/L1 < 1/32 | H0) 0.18% 0.34%
P(L0/L1 < 1/8 | H0) 1.9% 1.1%
P(L0/L1 > 8 | H1) 1.9% 1.1%
P(L0/L1 > 32 | H1) 0.18% 0.34%
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Figure 12: Four examples of sequential testing on the mean of a Gaussian distribution with
unit width. Plots (a) and (c) assume that H0 is true, whereas plots (b) and (d) assume the
truth of H1. A sequential testing procedure (see text) describes a random walk in the (p0, p1)
plane (shown by the black broken lines). The blue curves represent the boundary defined by
the law of the iterated logarithm (LIL). The red likelihood-ratio contours (for λ01 = 1/8 in
plots (a) and (c), and for λ01 = 8 in plots (b) and (d)) are examples of decision boundaries
that avoid the possibility of testing to a foregone conclusion implied by the LIL. The green
line in plots (b) and (d) represents the CLs = 5% decision boundary, which does not avoid
this possibility.
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Figure 13: Plot showing fifty fixed-hypothesis contours (green curves) crossed by a random
walk (black broken line) associated with a sequential test procedure of the Gauss(µ0, σ)
versus Gauss(µ1, σ) type. At each step the sample size n increases by one, and the walk
moves to a contour with improved resolution. Contours are labeled by the value of n. The
blue curve shows the relationship between p0 and n described by the LIL boundary. The red
dotted line represents a fixed discovery threshold α0. Since this line crosses to the large-p0
side of the LIL boundary, it is guaranteed to have the pathology of sampling to a foregone
conclusion. In contrast, with the p0 cutoff set as α0/
√
n (solid red line), repeated sampling
does not necessarily lead to exclusion of a true H0.
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Figure 14: Insight for the Jeffreys-Lindley paradox. The likelihod ratio contours in (a) are
those of figure 7(a) for comparing hypotheses whose pdf’s are equal-width Gaussians. The
line bcde is at fixed p0, with the points b to e corresponding to increasing separation of the
H0 and H1 pdf’s, as shown in diagrams (b) to (e) respectively.
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Figure 15: Plot of p0 versus prior-predictive p1 for testing H0 : µ = µ0 versus H1 : µ > µ0.
The test statistic has a Gaussian distribution with mean µ and standard deviation σ. The
prior for µ under H1 equals 1/τ for µ0 < µ ≤ µ0 + τ and is zero otherwise. Fixed-hypothesis
contours (dashed lines) are labeled by the value of τ/σ. Constant Bayes factor contours
(colored solid lines) are also shown.
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Figure 16: Log-log version of figure 15, with a larger range of fixed-hypothesis contours and
more realistic values for the Bayes factor contours. Also shown are the constant p0 threshold
(dotted line) at α0 = 1% and the corresponding n-dependent threshold α0/
√
n (dot-dashed
line), where n is the sample size.
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Figure 17: Plots illustrating what happens to the Jeffreys-Lindley paradox when H0 is an
interval hypothesis with width  instead of a point-null hypothesis. Both p0pp and p1pp are
prior-predictive p-values. The contours on these plots are the same as in figure 16, although
for clarity only the contours τ/σ = 10000 and B01 = 1 are labeled. Compared with figure 16,
the fixed-hypothesis contours and the constant Bayes factor contours are both changed in
such a way that the paradox remains present regardless of the value of /σ.
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Figure 18: Plots illustrating what happens to the Jeffreys-Lindley paradox when H0 is an
interval hypothesis with width  instead of a point-null hypothesis. The p-value p1pp is a
prior-predictive p-value, whereas p0 sup is a supremum p-value. The contours on these plots
are the same as in figure 16, although for clarity only the contours τ/σ = 10000 and B01 = 1
are labeled. Compared with figure 16, only the constant Bayes factor contours are changed;
the fixed-hypothesis contours are the same. The result is that the paradox disappears for a
suitably high value of /σ.
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Figure 19: Plot of the integrated pdf (44) for several values of the parameter θ (the pdf for
θ = 100 has been truncated at the upper end). If for example x = 2 is observed, the p-value
under H0 : θ = 0 is 2.3% (shaded area), but the likelihood ratio of θ = 0 to θ = 100 is 5.5.
It is clear that for very large θ values, significantly small p-values that disfavor H0 will be
associated with likelihood ratios that favor H0. This is a simple versus simple version of the
Jeffreys-Lindley paradox.
